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Abstract: A decade has passed since the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR/Court) for the first 
time recognized asylum seekers as ‘a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need 
of special protection’ (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011). For many years this approach could be seen as 
forming a part of the Strasbourg paradigm with regard to the protection of rights and freedoms of foreigners 
seeking for international protection in States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Despite a noticeable shift within this paradigm (see especially Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, 2019), vulnerability 
– although now on more individualized, in contrast to its group form, when the applicant’s vulnerability is 
determined by belonging to a specific category of persons ‒ still have a role to play in the ECtHR’s assessments 
of responsibility of the respondent States with regard to the violations of the applicant’s rights. Recognizing 
vulnerability as a normative category in the Strasbourg case law, thus as a qualification that produces concrete, 
legal effects for States’ obligations under the ECHR (which must be seen as a primary, overriding justification 
for its application by the Court), the present article examines the ECtHR’s references to vulnerability of asylum 
seekers, explaining the structure of this argument (how and to what extent it is applied, on what grounds), 
with a special focus on the legal consequences associated to it in the light of the Strasbourg case law.
Keywords: European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Right, vulnerability, asylum-
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Introduction
In 2011 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR/Court) delivered its judgment in 
the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, in which the Court recognized for the first time that asylum 
seekers constitute ‘a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special 
protection’2 and made it a key argument in assessing the responsibility of the respondent States with 
regard to the violations of the applicant’s rights. The significance of this finding has been recognized 
in human rights and migration literature3, as well as by the ECtHR itself, which on a later occasion 
1 Katarzyna Urszula Gałka. Department of Human Rights Protection and International Humanitarian Law, Institute of 
Legal Sciences, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, ORCID: 0000-0003-2532-6907, galka@uksw.edu.pl.
2 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, [GC], No. 30696/09, of 21 Jan. 2011, para 251. For commentaries on the judgments in 
various aspects see for example: 1) Clayton G. (2011). Asylum seekers in Europe: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, in: Human 
Rights Law Review, 2011, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 758–772; 2) Brandl U., Czech Ph. (2017), General and Specific Vulnerability 
of Protection-Seekers in the EU: Is there an Adequate Response to their Needs?. p. 248. In: Ippolito F., Iglesias Sánchez S. 
(Eds.). Protecting Vulnerable Groups. The European Human Rights Framework; 3) Mikołajczyk B. (2015). Europejski Trybunał 
Praw Człowieka a „system dubliński”. Uwagi w związku z wyrokiem ETPCz w sprawie M.S.S. przeciwko Belgii i Grecji. 
In: Brodowska L., Kuźniar-Kwiatek D. (Eds.). Unia Europejska a prawo międzynarodowe: księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Prof. 
Elżbiecie Dyni. Rzeszów 2015, s. 267–276. Also more recently: Baumgärtel M. (2020). Facing the challenge of migratory 
vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights. In: Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights. Vol. 38(1). p 12-29.




noted that with M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ‘initiated a change in its jurisprudence’4 concerning 
migrants seeking international protection, however it also met certain criticism (including on the 
part of some judges of the Court)5. Despite controversies, the ECtHR had consistently maintained 
for many years its approach recognizing asylum seekers as a vulnerable group, which resulted in 
recognizing that each such person required a special protection under the 1950 Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms6, that is the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR/Convention)7. Thus, for many years this approach could be seen as forming 
a part of the Strasbourg paradigm with regard to the protection of rights and freedoms of foreigners 
seeking for international protection. Although the Court’s judgment of 2019 in the case of Ilias and 
Ahmed v. Hungary8 may be perceived as reflection of a shift in this paradigm9, for it actually departs 
from the group vulnerability argument with regard to asylum seekers, it should be noted that it does 
not abandon vulnerability considerations as such.
This article does not purport to analyze in details the shift in the Strasbourg paradigm with 
regard to asylum seekers and application of group vulnerability argument (its rationale, dynamics 
and effects). Rather it takes a more modest perspective, tending to describe and explain the legal 
effects associated with the vulnerability characteristics in the light of the case law concerning 
asylum seekers. With this aim in mind, it precedes with some comments on legal effects, with a 
brief description of vulnerability as a normative category in the Strasbourg case law and explanation 
of how the Court applied in its case law vulnerability argument to asylum seekers.
4 ECtHR, V.M. and Others v. Belgium, No. 60125/11, of 7 Jul. 2015, para. 136 (delivered by the Chamber, subsequently 
replaced by the judgment of the Grand Chamber strucking the application from the list without entering into the merits, 
see: the Grand Chamber judgment of 17 Nov. 2016). 
5 Eg. Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajó, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, [GC]. Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Ranzoni, joined by Judges López Guerra, Sicilianos and P. Lemmens, the Grand Chamber judgment of 17 Nov. 
2016 in the case of V.M. and Others v. Belgium, para 5; 
6 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 005); the ECHR was opened 
for signature in Rome on 4 Nov. 1950, it entered into force on 3 Dec. 1953. Currently there are 47 State Parties to the 
Convention.
7 Compare: Brandl and Czech. p. 251. See decisions of the ECtHR: Mohammed Hussein and Others v, the Netherlands and Italy, 
No. 27725/10, of 02 April 2013, particularly para. 76 and 78; Daytbegova and Magomedova v. Austria, No. 6198/12, of 04 Jun. 
2013, para 65; Halimi v. Austria and Italy, No. 53852/11, of 18 Jun. 2013; in particular para 64. Also, indirectly, references to 
the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment in two decisions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in which the ECtHR found 
that, by analogy with asylum seekers, a particularly vulnerable and underprivileged population group are displaced persons 
(Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, No. 13216/05, of 14.12.2011, para 146; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, No. 40167/06, of 14.12.2011, 
para 145).
8 ECtHR, Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary,[GC], No. 47287/15, of 21 Nov. 2019.
9 The judgment is part of Strasbourg jurisprudence, in which the Court acknowledges that the so-called the migration crisis 
in Europe constitutes an important context, which should be taken into account by the Court, when assessing violations 
of the ECHR. 
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Vulnerability as a normative category in the Strasbourg case law
In general terms, vulnerability of a person may be described as an increased susceptibility 
of that person to threats and risks of harm (therefore being a potential or actual risks) and in 
consequence also to violations of his/her human rights10, wherein such susceptibility may have 
various origins/sources. The ECtHR for over a dozen of years now has been paying increasing 
attention to the applicant’s vulnerability when assessing alleged violations of human rights 
enshrined in the ECHR11. Particular attention is payed to the ECtHR’s reference to vulnerability 
regarding a certain population group12. Then the entire, specified category of entities is considered 
to be particularly vulnerable, and thus the applicant’s vulnerability is determined by belonging to 
this category of persons, and not by his/her individual characteristics or circumstances in which he 
or she was found13.
The ECtHR does not provide an abstract definition of vulnerability in its jurisprudence14 
and the content of the concept must be decoded on the case by case basis. The argument based on 
vulnerability appears to be flexible, leaving to the Court a substantial discretion to assess the facts 
in a particular case through the prism of vulnerability and to attribute to them certain consequences 
as regards the responsibility of the States parties to the ECHR. While, there is some ambiguity with 
this regard and the Court does not apply vulnerability in a systematized, coherent manner, one may 
also agree with those Authors, who see the advantages of such an approach with its flexibility that 
allows the Court to adequately take into account specific circumstances and contexts of the case15.
10 Eg. Nifosi-Sutton I. (2017). The Protection of Vulnerable Groups under International Human Rights Law. London. p. 4.
11 See the data presented in: Al Tamimi Y. (2016). The Protection of Vulnerable Groups and Individuals by the European 
Court of Human Rights. In: Journal européen des droits de l’homme/European Journal of Human Rights”. No. 5, p. 563 
(the data cover the period to the end of 2013, but show well the quantitative change that has occurred in this respect since 
2006).
12 About vulnerability in international human rights law see e.g.: Xenos D., (2009). The Human Rights of Vulnerable. In: The 
International Journal of Human Rights. Vol. 13. No. 4. p. 591-614; Peroni L., Timmer A. (2013), Vulnerable Groups: The 
Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law. In: International Journal of Constitutional 
Law. Vol. 11. No. 4. p.. 1056–1085. https://www.academic.oup.com/icon/article/11/4/1056/698712 [access: 15 Feb. 2020]; 
Timmer A. (2013). A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights. p. 147-170. In: Fineman M., 
Grear A (Eds.). Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics, Farnham 2013; Ruet C. (2015). 
La vulnérabilité dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. In: Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme. No. 102, p. 317–340; Al Tamimi; Ippolito F., Iglesias Sánchez S. (Eds.). (2017) Protecting Vulnerable Groups. The 
European Human Rights Framework; Oxford; Nifosi-Sutton.
13 For discussion on advantages and disadvantages of this approach see i.a. Baumgärtel M. (2020). Facing the challenge of 
migratory vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights. In: Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights. Vol. 38(1). 
p 12-29 (with references).
14 The ECtHR avoids an ‘abstract generalization’ in the framework of adjudication (Mowbray A. (2005). The Creativity of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review. No. 1, p. 61) and one may argue that introducing by 
the Court specific terms always has a practical justification.




What is evident, is that the Court customarily associates the vulnerability characteristic 
with the requirement of ‘special considerations” or ‘special protection’16. This requirement, in turn, 
may entail an extended (broadened) scope of positive obligations17 incumbent on State-Parties 
to the ECHR or lead to narrowing down the margin of appreciation which is normally granted 
to States with regard to limitations imposed by them on the enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms18. In addition, vulnerability of the applicant/victim of a violation of the 
ECHR may impact his/her procedural status in the framework of the Convention mechanism19. All 
the above means that, the characteristic of vulnerability clearly has legal effects in the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR and as such it must be perceived as a normative category in the Strasbourg case law, 
notwithstanding any lacks of clarity or consistency which may accompany its application20.
Vulnerability of asylum seekers in the light of the Strasbourg case law
1. Before 2011, when the Court delivered its judgment in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, in cases where the applicants were asylum seekers, the Court (and the European Commission 
of Human Rights) had drawn attention to the vulnerability of some of the applicants, but such 
vulnerability resulted, for example, from being a minor21, belonging to a discriminated national 
minority22 or sexual minority23 or from a detention situation where the applicant, as ‘a foreigner in 
prison’, was under the sole control of the state24. The applicants’ particular vulnerability underlined 
in the arguments of the ECtHR did not, however, stem from their status as asylum seekers25. It is 
also worth adding that, in principle, it was not a decisive argument in the sense that, for example, 
in most cases relating to the allegation of inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 
of the ECHR, it was not sufficient to exceed the minimum level of severity required - despite the 
applicant’s vulnerability being noted, their allegations were considered manifestly unfounded and 
the complaints inadmissible26.
16 Eg. Oršuš and Others v. Croatia,[GC] No. 15766/03, of 16 Mar. 2010, para 147. Also e.g. Baumgärtel (2020). p. 23.
17 Eg. with regard to detainees see: ECtHR, Keller v. Russia, No. 26824/04, of 17 Oct. 2013, in particular para 81; with regard 
to Roma people see: ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, No. 11146/11, of 29 Jan. 2013 in particular para 116.
18 With regard to alleged violations of Article 14 of the ECHR (prohibition of discrimination) see: ECtHR, Kiyutin v. Russia, 
No. 2700/10, of 10 Marc. 2011, in particular para 63.
19 Eg. ECtHR, Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania, No. 47848/08, of 17 Jul. 2014 (with regard 
to locus standi requirement).
20 Compare Peroni and Timmer. With regard to vulnerability the Authors claims that ‘t]he term does something: it allows the 
Court to address different aspects of inequality in a more substantive manner’.
21 European Commission of Human Rights, Özdemir v. the Netherlands, No. 35758/97, of 07 Sep. 1998.
22 Eg. ECtHR, Ryabikin v. Russia, No. 8320/04, of 19 Jun. 2008; ECtHR, Kolesnik v. Russia, No. 26876/08, of 17 Jun. 2010.
23 ECtHR, F. v. United Kingdom, No. 17341/03., of 22 Jun. 2004; ECtHR, I.I.N. v. the Nethrelands, No. 2035/04, of 09 Dec. 2004.
24 ECtHR, Zhu v. United Kingdom, No. 36790/97, of 12 Sep. 2000.
25 But see also: ECtHR, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, No. 13178/03, of 12 Dec. 2006. 
26 Based on the Author’s review of cases available in the Hudoc database. See the decisions invoked supra. In contrast: 
Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium.
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2. Against this background, the already mentioned judgment in the case of M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece case stood out, for the Court took a totally different approach compering to its 
previous case law. It recognized all asylum seekers as a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable 
population group 27. The case concerned an Afghan citizen who, having fled Kabul via Iran and 
Turkey, reached Greece. There the applicant was imprisoned for a week, after which he was released 
and ordered to leave the territory. M.S.S. did not apply for international protection in Greece, but 
did so only in Belgium, to which he fled. The Belgian Authority, on the basis of the rules in force in 
the European Union at the time28, asked the Greek authorities to take responsibility for examining 
the complainant’s asylum application. After receiving confirmation from them that the applicant 
would be able to apply for asylum in Greece, Belgium deported M.S.S. On his arrival in Athens the 
applicant was arrested and placed in a detention facility near the airport. After four days, he was 
released and received a document proving his status as an asylum seeker. M.S.S. had no means 
of subsistence or a place where he could live and use sanitary facilities and facilities. He lived in 
one of the Athens parks where other Afghans seeking asylum in Greece gathered. He made two 
more attempts to leave Greece, once using false documents, for which he was again arrested and 
imprisoned in the same detention facility near Athens airport. At the time when the ECtHR was 
examining the complaint, the procedure of his asylum application had still not been completed and 
the applicant’s living conditions had not improved in any way.
In the judgment the Grand Chamber referred on several occasions to the applicant’s 
exceptional situation as a particularly vulnerable person. First, this argument was applied when the 
ECtHR assessed the compliance of the conditions of the applicant’s detention during his double 
imprisonment by the Greek authorities in the airport detention center with the requirements 
of Article 3 of the ECHR, and secondly, when the Grand Chamber examined the complaint of a 
violation of the same provision of the Convention in relation to the conditions of extreme poverty 
in which the applicant had to live in Greece while pending the examination of the application for 
international protection.
In the detention center the applicant, inter alia, was held in a small room with the other 
20 inmates, had no access to the fresh air, was given little food and slept either on a dirty mattress 
or on the floor, and the use of the toilet was only allowed with the permission of the guards. In 
assessing whether the applicant’s detention under the above conditions constituted a violation of 
Art. 3 of the Convention, despite the fact that it lasted relatively short (4 days for the first and 7 
days for the second time), the Court emphasized that it ‘must take into account that the applicant, 
being an asylum seeker, was particularly vulnerable because of everything he had been through 
during his migration and the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously’29. 
27 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 251.
28 In that time the so called Dublin II Regulation (OJ 25 Feb. 2003, L 50, p. 1-10).




Later in its argumentation, the ECtHR added that: ‘the applicant’s distress was accentuated by the 
vulnerability inherent in his situation as an asylum seeker’30.
Next, when dealing with the alleged violation of Article 3 of the ECHR on the basis of 
the conditions of extreme poverty in which the applicant lived while he waited for the asylum 
proceedings to be completed in his case, the Court stated that it attaches considerable importance to 
the applicant’s status as an asylum-seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged 
and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (…). It notes the existence of a broad 
consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as 
evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR and the standards 
set out in the Reception Directive31.
Assessing the measures taken by the Greek authorities, the ECtHR also noted that it ‘was 
known’ that asylum seekers lived in Greece in ‘the particular state of insecurity and vulnerability’ 
and for that reason the state authorities should provide shelter for M.S.S., without waiting for him 
to go to the police station with the information that he is homeless’32.
In conclusion, regarding violation of Article 3 of the ECHR by Greece, taking into account 
the applicant’s situation, the Court found that
the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability as an 
asylum-seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the situation in which he 
has found himself for several months, living on the street, with no resources or access to sanitary 
facilities, and without any means of providing for his essential needs33.
The above excerpts from the judgment shows that in the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case 
the qualification of the applicant as a vulnerable did not stem from his individual characteristics, nor 
a particular affiliation distinguishing him from other asylum seekers, nor his individual experiences, 
but it resulted of the very status of the asylum-seeker, to whom vulnerability is inherently linked. 
According to this approach, it is an affiliation with this particularly vulnerable group of people –
regardless of its internal diversity – that is decisive and in consequence each individual belonging to 
it is entitled to such special protection34.
In the subsequent case law the Court confirmed that qualification of asylum seekers as a 
vulnerable group is applicable to each one of them, regardless of the country in which he or she seeks 
international protection35. Also it clearly distinguished the status of asylum seekers as a vulnerable 
30 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 233.
31 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 251.
32 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 259.
33 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 263.
34 See Brandl and Czech, p. 249–251. See also Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajó, M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece, [GC].
35 See a number of decisions and judgments in cases of asylum seekers in Italy (e.g. ECtHR, Mohammed Hussein and Others v. 
the Netherlands and Italy, No. 27725/10, of 02 Apr. 2013,76; ECtHR, Halimi v. Austria and Italy, No. 53852/11, 18 Jun. 2013; 
ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, [GC], of 04 Nov. 2014; ECtHR, FM and Others v. Denmark, No. 20159/16, of 19 Sep. 2016). 
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group from the status of foreigners whose application for asylum has already been examined and 
rejected or who have not applied for it at all36.
3. The recognition by the ECtHR of asylum seekers as a vulnerable group in need of special 
protection under the ECHR was not based directly on the text of the Convention, but was the result 
of its judicial interpretation by the Court. In doing so, the ECtHR invoked the existence of a ‘broad 
international and European consensus’, which it identified exclusively through references to the 
Geneva Convention, UNHCR’s activities and EU reception regulations. Referring to the European 
consensus or individual acts of international, European and national law has already played an 
important argumentative role when the Court decided to distinguish a particular group of people 
as a vulnerable one for the purposes of the Convention37. However in such instances, the consensus 
was treated as a confirmation that a given group had experienced in the past discrimination, 
marginalization or prejudice by society, leading to their social exclusion38, which in turn was the 
source and cause of the Court’s recognition of their vulnerability. It is therefore noteworthy that, 
with regard to asylum seekers, the ECtHR did not explicitly indicate the reasons to distinguish them 
as a particularly vulnerable group other than ‘broad international and European consensus’, which 
did not identify the source of vulnerability, but rather confirmed the need for ‘special protection’ of 
this category of entities39.
Thus, when trying to understand the essence/source of vulnerability regarding asylum 
seekers, one should search for the guidelines in the Court’s findings with regard specific circumstances 
of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case. The analysis reveals that in the light of the judgment there 
are two elements which make asylum-seekers particularly vulnerable, since such persons not only 
arrive in the receiving State in a vulnerable condition, but that State makes them vulnerable40. The 
Grand Chamber classified the applicant as vulnerable ‘because of everything he had gone through 
The situation in Italy itself, according to the ECtHR, cannot, however, be compared with the situation in Greece at the 
time of the judgment in the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case.
36 In Hunde v. the Netherlands (ECtHR, No. 17931/16, of 05 Jul. 2016, para 55) the ECtHR found such differences to be 
significant, although it also held that the loss of the right to legally stay in the territory of the Netherlands due to the 
rejection of an asylum application ‘did not automatically affect his [the applicant - KG] particular vulnerability as a 
migrant’. However, the ECtHR also pointed that the applicant’s situation in Hunde v. the Netherlands differed from that 
of M.S.S., as in the latter case it was ‘linked to his status as an asylum seeker and, consequently, his suffering could have 
been alleviated if the Greek authorities quickly examined his asylum application’. In contrast, in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, 
the Grand Chamber admitted, in assessing the conditions of their detention, that the applicants had been ‘mentally and 
physically weak’ after having made the dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean Sea, but made it clear that they were not 
asylum seekers and they did not possess the particular vulnerability inherent in such status, nor did they claim to have 
experienced traumatic experiences in their country of origin (ECtHR, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, No. 16483/12, of 15 Dec. 
2016, para 194).
37 Thus, pointing to the need for special protection of the Roma population, the Tribunal referred in its explanatory 
memorandum to the recommendations of various bodies of the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly, Committee 
of Ministers, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Commissioner for Human Rights), similarly 
in the case of people infected with HIV or patients with AIDS, in which he additionally referred to the relevant documents 
of the United Nations.
38 See Al Tamimi Y, p. 569–570 with references to the ECtHR case law.
39 Noted by Brandl and Czech (p. 249). Also Baumgärtel (2020).




during the migration and the traumatic experiences he possibly had previously experienced’, adding 
that vulnerability was inextricably linked to his status as an asylum seeker, on the other hand, it 
stated that
the situation complained of by the applicant had been in place since his transfer to Greece 
in June 2009. It is linked to his status as an asylum seeker and the fact that his asylum application 
has not yet been investigated by the Greek authorities. In other words, the Court is of the opinion 
that if they had examined the applicant’s asylum application promptly, the Greek authorities could 
significantly alleviate his suffering41.
Therefore, vulnerability of asylum seekers results from the difficult experiences that led 
them to flee their homeland (vulnerability ex ante), and on the other hand from the situation in 
which they found themselves while waiting for a decision on international protection (vulnerability 
ex post)42. The second element that makes up vulnerability is the result of the actions and omissions 
of a state party to the ECHR leading to violations of human rights43. Such understanding of 
vulnerability of asylum seekers, that encompasses also vulnerability ex post, which in turn depends 
directly on the actions and omissions of the State Party to the Convention, introduces an additional 
element of relativity into this characteristic.
4. While recognizing all asylum seekers as vulnerable, the ECtHR also takes into account 
the fact that, in the case of some applicants, their vulnerability is not only linked to the status of 
applicants for international protection, but also stems from the fact of belonging to a different 
category of people in need of special protection, like e.g. children, single mothers with young 
children, mentally ill people44. The literature on the subject use the term compounded vulnerability45 
regarding such instances, in which there is more than one basis of the applicant’s vulnerability, 
which makes his/her position ‘extreme’ or ‘accentuated’46.
5. At the end of this part of the article, one should explain the difference in approach 
taken by the ECtHR in the already mentioned Hungarian case (Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary). Here, 
the Court applied a distinct standard of vulnerability comparing to its previous case law, focusing 
on verification whether the applicants ‘may be classified as particularly vulnerable’47. In this case 
the ECtHR paraphrased its M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece dictum, stressing that ‘it is true that asylum 
seekers m a y  b e  considered particularly vulnerable due to everything they have gone through 
41 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 262.
42 Ibid.
43 The term vulnerability ex post taken from: Timmer A., p. 155. As a confirmation of such understanding of vulnerability of 
asylum seekers, including both its ex ante and ex post from can be read the already mentioned decision in the Hunde v. the 
Netherlands case.
44 Eg. ECtHR, Popov v. France, No. 39472/07 and 39474/07, 19 Jan. 2012; ECtHR, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. 
Belgium, No. 13178/03, of 12 Dec. 2006; ECtHR, F.M. v. Denmark, No. 20159/16, of 19 Sep. 2016, para 23.
45 The term proposed by Timmer A., p. 161, also used by Brandl and Czech, p. 250.
46 E.g. ECtHR, Popov v. France, No. 39472/07 and 39474/07, 19 Jan. 2012, para 91.
47 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, para 191.
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during migration and the traumatic experiences they may have had before’ (emphasis - KG), and at 
the same time the Court observed that ‘here are no indications that the applicants in this case were 
more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker’48 held in a transit area49. Thus, in this case the 
Court departed from the group vulnerability approach with regard to asylum seekers - an asylum 
seeker may be a particularly vulnerable person, but this is determined by specific circumstances, 
his individual characteristics or experiences, and not affiliation with the group of asylum seekers. 
Moreover, in assessing whether the applicants were particularly vulnerable, the Court appraised 
them not through the prism of other members of society, but in comparison with other asylum 
seekers, reducing in this way the number of migrants seeking international protection, who could 
be considered to be in need of special protection as a consequence of their vulnerability within the 
meaning of the Strasbourg case law.
Vulnerability of asylum seekers: the legal effects in the light of the Strasbourg case law
Turning back to the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment, in this part of the article, 
the legal consequences of the group vulnerability approach taken towards asylum seekers will be 
discussed. The argument is taken into account by the ECtHR, in particular, when assessing the 
allegations of violation by states parties to the ECHR of the prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment, as set out in Article 3 of the Convention. The applicants’ particular vulnerability to 
threats is one of the factors influencing the assessment of the minimum level of severity - the 
threshold criterion which must be met for Article 3 of the ECHR to be applicable and, consequently, 
the criterion of key importance for establishing a violation of that provision50. According to settled 
case-law, the Court associates with the characteristics of vulnerability the obligation of a State 
Party to the ECHR to provide effective protection to all vulnerable persons within its jurisdiction. 
In the framework of this obligation the State must take reasonable steps to prevent all instances 
of ill-treatment, that it knew or should have known. The applicant’s vulnerability is a significant 
element taken in consideration by the ECtHR for the purposes of assessing the State’s compliance 
with that obligation.
In the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR pointed to the existence of two types of 
positive obligations towards asylum seekers which, under Article 3 of the ECHR are incumbent on 
the States-Parties to the Convention. The first one was actual in the situation of detention, while 
the existence of the second was related to the conditions of extreme poverty in which the applicant 
48 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, para 192.
49 The Court’s assessment took into account the fact that the difficult experiences referred to by the applicants took place 
several years earlier, as well as the material conditions in the transit area, the relatively short duration of the applicants’ 
deprivation of liberty and the awareness of both applicants of the pending asylum proceedings in their cases (Ilias and 
Ahmed v. Hungary, para 192 and 193).
50 With regard to vulnerability and minimum level of severity see especially: ECtHR, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, No. 16483/12, 




had to live, awaiting the conclusion of the proceedings concerning granting him international 
protection.
As regards the first obligation, the ECtHR found a violation of the Convention, despite 
the relatively short period of detention (4 days for the first and 7 days for the second deprivation of 
liberty, respectively). As the ECtHR emphasized, given the applicant’s particular vulnerability as an 
asylum seeker, these periods could not be considered ‘as being insignificant’51. Ultimately, the Court 
took the position that taken together ‘the feeling of arbitrariness and inferiority and fear often 
associated with it, as well as the profound impact that such conditions of detention undoubtedly 
have on the dignity of a person’ detention constituted degrading treatment within the meaning of 
Article 3 of the ECHR52, which was further exacerbated by the applicant’s vulnerability ‘connected 
with his situation as an asylum seeker’53. The above reveals that the applicant’s affiliation with a 
vulnerable group causes a lowering of the minimum level of severity threshold for the purposes 
of Article 3 of the Convention. The same treatment, which in the instance of another person, e.g. 
due to its length, would not be considered severe enough to generate responsibility of a State party 
to the ECHR for a violation of Article 3, applied to an asylum seeker, may lead to violation of the 
prohibition of ill-treatment54.
The impact of the argument based on the vulnerability of asylum seekers is even more 
evident in the light of the Court’s findings in the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece concerning obligations 
of State Parties to the ECHR with regard to living conditions in extreme poverty. For the ECtHR 
has repeatedly emphasized that the interpretation of the ECHR cannot lead to the reading of the 
obligation of States Parties to provide a home to all persons under their jurisdiction, as well as 
providing financial assistance to refugees enabling them to maintain a certain standard of living55. 
However, in the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case, relying essentially on two grounds, namely the 
applicant’s vulnerability as an asylum seeker, and the fact that the obligation to provide decent 
material conditions to asylum seekers arises directly from the provisions of Greek national law 
implementing the EU law, the Court stated that Greece, under Article 3 of the ECHR, was obliged 
to provide the applicant with living conditions in which his basic needs could be met56.
51 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 232.
52 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 233.
53 Ibid.
54 Peroni and Timmer rightly point that ill-treatment ‘looks bigger through the vulnerability lens’. This position adopted 
with regard to the minimum level of severity was upheld by the Court in the subsequent case law.
55 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 249 with references to the case law.
56 In the commentary on the judgment in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece G. Clayton indicated that there could be 
different interpretations of the position regarding the responsibility of ECHR States Parties to the extreme poverty of 
asylum seekers. According to the first of them, the reference by the ECtHR to the provisions of national law implementing 
the EU directive has an impact, but is not decisive, for inferring a positive obligation in this respect. In the light of the 
second interpretation, however, this is a constitutive premise (condition) of the obligation (Clayton, p. 767). Subsequent 
case law has shown that the second interpretation is correct.
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The Court’s reasoning clearly shows that vulnerability is a yardstick for assessing the 
fulfillment of both conditions of responsibility in relation to the positive obligations of the States 
Parties under Article 3, namely the criterion of knowledge (‘whether he had or should have had 
knowledge of the risk of ill-treatment’) and the criterion of taking reasonable steps to prevent ill-
treatment. In the M.S.S. judgment, the ECtHR expressed the opinion that it did not see how the 
Greek authorities might not have noticed or assumed57 that the applicant was homeless and argued 
that given the particular state of insecurity and vulnerability in which asylum-seekers were known 
to live in Greece, the authorities should have taken measures to provide shelter to the applicant 
without waiting for him to inform them of his homelessness58. Moreover, the Court also found that 
the State should not only have provided the applicant with shelter, but also had a duty to find a way 
to inform him that such shelter had been secured for him59.
4. The Grand Chamber’s findings in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, as regards violation 
of Article 3 in view of the conditions of the applicant’s detention and the conditions of his life in 
extreme poverty, also had consequences for the finding that Belgium was responsible under the 
ECHR for deporting the applicant to Greece, where he had suffered degrading treatment. It should 
be emphasized that this was a departure from the previously consistent position of the Court, 
according to which, the continued use of medical and special services or assistance by a foreigner in 
an ECHR country is not an argument that a migrant may effectively rely on in order to obtain the 
right to stay on territory of that State. Only in exceptional circumstances, i.e. when it is justified 
by ‘compelling humanitarian grounds’60, a decision to expel a seriously ill person from the territory 
may give rise to a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Although several Authors 
observed that the M.S.S. judgment could forecast more flexible position of the Court towards social 
and economic vulnerability of asylum seekers61 and while such an interpretation could seem to be 
justified in the light of the judgment in the case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom62, nevertheless 
the Court began to place greater emphasis on the fact that in the M.S.S. the obligation to ensure 
adequate living conditions was part of the positive Greek law to which the Greek authorities were 
bound.
The conditions for applying the criteria established in the judgment of M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece, the ECtHR specified further in its judgment in the case of S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom63 
and subsequently confirmed in the 2014 Grand Chamber judgments in Tarkahel v. Switzerland64 and 
57 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 258.
58 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 259.
59 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 260.
60 ECtHR, N. v. United Kingdom, No. 26565/05, of 27 May 2008, para 42.
61 E.g. Timmer, p. 160.
62 ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. United Kingdom, No. 8319/07 and 11449/07, of 28 Jun. 2011.
63 ECtHR, S.H.H. v. United Kingdom, No. 60367/10, of 29 Jan 2013.




in 2016 in Paposhvili v. Belgium65. In these judgments, the Court has clearly delimited the cases which, 
in its opinion, should be examined in accordance with the principles established in the M.S.S. and 
others concerning the expulsion of foreigners from the territories of State Parties to the Convention. 
In doing so, the ECtHR noted, first, that in the M.S.S. the conditions of extreme poverty in which 
the applicant lived were the result of an omission by Greece, a party to the ECHR, which was under 
a positive obligation under national and European law to ensure adequate reception conditions for 
asylum seekers66. Second, the Court considered that in the M.S.S. the applicant’s extreme poverty 
was related to his status as an asylum seeker and the failure of the Greek authorities to process his 
application67.
Conclusions
The ECtHR for over a dozen of years now has been paying increasing attention to the 
applicant’s vulnerability when assessing alleged violations of human rights enshrined in the ECHR. 
In some instances the Court refers to the concept of vulnerability regarding a certain population 
group. In such cases the entire specified category of entities is considered to be particularly 
vulnerable, and thus the applicant’s vulnerability is determined by belonging to this category of 
persons, and not by its individual characteristics or circumstances in which he or she was found. 
The characterization of an applicant as a ‘vulnerable’ always produces certain legal effects linked to 
the requirement of ‘special protection’, they are determined by the Court itself. As producing legal 
consequences in the area of States’ obligations, the vulnerability must be perceived as a normative 
category in the ECHR law.
In 2011 the ECtHR acknowledged that asylum seekers constitute ‘a particularly 
underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection’, setting a new 
direction in Strasbourg case law concerning this group of persons.
The Court’s recognition of vulnerability of asylum seekers has consequences for the 
State Parties to the Convention regarding positive obligations. It should be emphasized that these 
obligations do not result directly from the text of the ECHR, but have been formulated by the 
Court through its interpretation of the Convention. The essence of these obligations is to take 
action, therefore they require activity on the part of the State. At the same time, very often these 
are activities in the social sphere, which was not explicitly included in the scope of the Convention, 
but to which, according to the position of the ECtHR expressed in the late 1970s, the interpretation 
of guarantees established by the ECHR by the Court may extend68.
65 ECtHR, Paposhvili v. Belgium, No.41738/10, of 13 Dec. 2016.
66 S.H.H. v. United Kingdom, para 90.
67 Ibid.
68 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, No. 6289/73, 09 Oct. 1979, para 26.
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In cases concerning asylum seekers it can be observed that the Court associates social 
implications with guarantees, which are ‘typical’ guarantees belonging to the sphere of civil 
rights, which are liberties in nature. By way of example, it can be pointed out that the degrading 
conditions of detention of persons characterized by the ECtHR as vulnerable may not only lead 
to an infringement of Art. 3 of the ECHR, but also have consequences for the assessment of the 
compliance of the deprivation of liberty of these persons with the requirements resulting from 
the guarantee of the right to liberty and personal security (Article 5 (1) (f) of the ECHR). Indeed, 
according to the case law of the ECtHR, in order for a person to be deprived of liberty in a manner 
compatible with the requirements of the above-mentioned provision of the Convention, it must 
not only be used for the purpose of executing deportation, but also there must be ‘a certain link 
between the grounds of deprivation of liberty and the place and conditions of detention’. The fact 
that the conditions of detention have not been adjusted, for example, to the ‘extreme vulnerability’ 
of children, is a factor that may determine a State’s responsibility for violating Article 5 (1) lit. f of 
the ECHR.
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